Ein Geheimdienstdossier und seine Leser

Zu früh gefreut? “Die Kehrtwende der Geheimdienste lässt die Mullahs frohlocken: Das neue Iran-Dossier aus den USA sei der endgültige Beweis für ihre friedlichen Atomambitionen, jubelt die Regierung in Teheran” so “Spiegel Online”. Grund genug, einen Blick in das “National Intelligence Estimate” (NIE) selbst zu werfen.

Dort lesen wir auf Seite 4: “This NIE does not assume that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons. ” Weiter scheint man in Teheran nicht gelesen zu haben, in der Redaktion des “Spiegel” allerdings auch nicht. Denn “to assume” heisst nicht nur “vermuten”, sondern auch “voraussetzen”, was aus dem Kontext heraus die einzig mögliche Bedeutung ist, wie der nachfolgende Satz zeigt:

Rather, it examines the intelligence to assess Iran’s capability and intent (or lack thereof) to acquire nuclear weapons, taking full account of Iran’s dual-use uranium fuel cycle and those nuclear activities that are at least partly civil in nature.

Das heisst: Die Existenz von Atomwaffen wird nicht vorausgesetzt, sondern es wird der Versuch unternommen, zu einer Einschätzung zu gelangen, ob das Regime überhaupt nach Atomwaffen strebt. Und dazu heisst es (Hervorhebung von mir, MK):

We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.

• We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.
• We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.)
• We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.

Also: Nichts genaues weiss man nicht, aber offensichtlich hat internationaler Druck in der Vergangenheit Wirkung gezeigt. Und weiter:

… We also assess with high confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.

… We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon.

Nach dieser Einschätzung kann also nicht mit Sicherheit gesagt werden, was das Mullahregime plant. Davon abgesehen würde ein Atomwaffenprogramm wohl eher im Geheimen durchgeführt werden als ausgerechnet an den für das Nuklearprogramm offiziell deklarierten Stätten.

Entwarnung also? Keineswegs.

Tags: Atomwaffen, Iran, Sicherheit, USA

This entry was posted on Tuesday, December 4th, 2007 at 14:59 and is filed under Iran, Medien. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed.