Iranische Geschichte durchs Schlüsselloch betrachtet

Da im Kommentarbereich zu meinem vorletzten Posting über voreheliche Sexualität im Osmanischen Reich debattiert wird, möchte ich auf diese Vorabbesprechung des nächsten Buches von Janet Afary hinweisen:

In her new book, Afary’s extensive section on pre-modern Iran, documented by a close reading of ancient texts, portrays the dominant form of same-sex relations as a highly-codified “status-defined homosexuality,” in which an older man – presumably the active partner in sex – acquired a younger partner, or amrad.

Afary demonstrates how, in this period, “male homoerotic relations in Iran were bound by rules of courtship such as the bestowal of presents, the teaching of literary texts, bodybuilding and military training, mentorship, and the development of social contacts that would help the junior partner’s career. Sometimes men exchanged vows, known as brotherhood sigehs [a form of contractual temporary marriage, lasting from a few hours to 99 years, common among heterosexuals] with homosocial or homosexual overtones.

Solche Praktiken sollen bis in die Qajarenzeit (1779-1925) weit verbreitet gewesen sein. Die Homophobie drang während der konstitutionellen Revolution ein. Die Schuld wird aber nicht bösen Puritanern zugeschrieben:

One of her most stunning revelations is how an Azeri-language newspaper edited and published in the Russian Caucuses, Molla Nasreddin (or MN, which appeared from 1906 to 1931) influenced this Iranian Revolution with a “significant new discourse on gender and sexuality,” sharing Marx’s well-documented contempt for homosexuals. With an editorial board that embraced Russian social democratic concepts, including women’s rights, MN was also “the first paper in the Shi’i Muslim world to endorse normative heterosexuality,” echoing Marx’s well-documented contempt for homosexuality. Afary writes that “this illustrated satirical paper, which circulated among Iranian intellectuals and ordinary people alike, was enormously popular in the region because of its graphic cartoons.”

Nach der Machtübernahme von Reza Khan ging der Staat schließlich gegen Homosexuelle als Symbol einer dekadenten Elite vor. Die Opposition gegen das Schah-Regime bediente sich dann ihrerseits wieder dieses Stereotyps:

In that earlier work, she and her co-author, Kevin B. Anderson, wrote: “There is… a long tradition in nationalist movements of consolidating power through narratives that affirm patriarchy and compulsory heterosexuality, attributing sexual abnormality and immorality to a corrupt ruling elite that is about to be overthrown and/or is complicit with foreign imperialism. Not all the accusations leveled against the [the deposed shah of Iran, and his] Pahlevi family and their wealthy supporters stemmed from political and economic grievances. A significant portion of the public anger was aimed at their ‘immoral’ lifestyle. There were rumors that a gay lifestyle was rampant at the court. The shah’s prime minister, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, was said to have been a homosexual. The satirical press routinely lampooned him for his meticulous attire, the purple orchid in his lapel, and his supposed marriage of convenience. The shah himself was rumored to be bisexual. There were reports that a close male friend of the shah from Switzerland, a man who knew him from their student days in that country, routinely visited him.

“But the greatest public outrage was aimed at two young, elite men with ties to the court who held a mock wedding ceremony. Especially to the highly religious, this was public confirmation that the Pahlevi house was corrupted with the worst kinds of sexual transgressions, that the shah was no longer master of his own house. These rumors contributed to public anger, to a sense of shame and outrage, and ultimately were used by the Islamists in their calls for a revolution.”

Soon after coming to power in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini established the death penalty for homosexuality.

Ich finde dies aus zwei Gründen sehr interessant. Erstens weil gezeigt wird, dass auch vormoderne islamische Gesellschaften Lebensbereiche kannten, in denen religiös begründete Normen ignoriert wurde. Zweitens, weil mir diese “blame the West”-Theorie, die die Homophobie als linkes Importgut ausmacht, sehr plausibel erscheint, im Gegensatz zu solchen Varianten, welche die Schuld in viktorianischen Normen suchen. Linke Homophobie, die als Kritik an einer dekadenten Oberschicht auftritt, findet sich auch in der Türkei, beispielsweise bei dem hier schon mehrfach behandelten Doğu Perinçek[1]. Über die Verachtung des Hausgotts türkischer Linker, Che Guevara, für “Schwuchteln” findet man hier einiges.

1. http://www.kaynakyayinlari.com/pinfo.asp?pid=2126 ⇧

Tags: Che Guevara, Doğu Perinçek, Fürstenspiegel, Feminismus, Geschichte, Homophobie, Homosexualität, Iran, Karl Marx, Khomeini, konstitutionelle Revolution, Linksnationalismus (Türkei), Qajaren, Reza Khan, Sexualität, Türkei

This entry was posted on Thursday, March 5th, 2009 at 10:28 and is filed under Iran, Lebenswelten, Religion & Moderne, Türkei. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed.