Mauretanische Außenpolitik
Der Annäherung des mauretanischen Präsidenten Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz an Venezuela und Iran widmet sich Kal auf “The Moor Next Door”:
Some in his circle believe that Ould Abdel Aziz sees himself in the manner of a za’im, pushing consensus among Arabo-Muslim leaders. In the way of Mokhtar Ould Daddah, it is argued, he is exploiting the international system to Mauritania’s gain, using ideological fault lines to irritate other actors into adjusting their position to Mauritania’s favor. In that analogy, Iran is akin to communist China, whom Ould Daddah recognized to gain Chinese support on a range of development and diplomatic causes. He kept a strong relationship with France but spoke out against it where useful. Here, it is said, he is using Iran and the anti-western camp (if such a thing exists) to gain needed economic and political support for his regime. This ignores, however, that in his outreach to those players he risks alienating long standing partners, with proven records of providing projects and cash. This is most clear in the Gulf and in Europe. France’s displeasure with the visit seems to speak to this; he gains nothing from the Gulf states by moving nudging up to Iran. It stands to damage his standing with the rich Arabs. It is rumored he hopes to squeeze millions of dollars out of the Iranians. He should worry that the closer he draws to Tehran, the more stress he puts on his relations with wealthier and more powerful allies.
Mit diesem außenpolitischen Abenteurertum hat er einen Vorgänger:
One is reminded of Ould Tayya’s courting of Iraq in the midsts of the first Gulf Crisis. The motivations were similar. There was an element of ideology and a failure to appreciate the precariousness of the new ally. The financial benefits from that relationship were similar, though Iran today might have slightly more to offer than Iraq in those days. Ould Tayya realized the danger of putting too much emphasis there and eventually changed his tune. Ould Abdel Aziz may see a similar possibility in Iran, in which he can play up his neo-Non-Allied and Islamic credibility while keeping open and alternate flow of investment into the country. The timing is curious, though, given the international climate of late. At once it might appear clever and imprudent; it comes at a time when the rich world is preoccupied with money troubles and while the Iranian problem seems only to grow worse and worse from the western perspective. Close associations with Tehran are difficult in the medium to long-term.
In Mauritanian diplomatic circles there is a sense of confusion. If the General is interested in south-south cooperation, these people say, why not pick a more kosher partner? Brazil is one that comes up frequently as a smarter alternative. There is a record of cooperation — one of Mauritania’s major roads is evidence — and the Brazilians can provide technological and development expertise far more readily than the Iranians. Their ideological appeal is only lacking in that they are not Muslims. The Brazilians, by Mauritanian estimates, have a similar, yet more pragmatic, reluctance to be beholden to or subject to Great Powers. One Mauritanian, in exasperation, exclaimed “they [the Brazilians] are more like us!” remarking that the Iranians may be Muslims but that they do the religion no good. But the General, it seems, prefers to go hardcore.
Die Annäherungspolitik erkärt er mit dem Ausbleiben westlicher Unterstützung, nachdem er duch einen Putsch an die Macht kam. Dehalb betrachtet er auch den Bruch mit Israel nicht als ideologisch motiviert.
–––Much of the English writing on the visit has highlighted the Ahmadinejad’s praise for Ould Abdel Aziz’s cutting ties with Israel last year. That is obviously an important part of the two country’s relationship under Ould Abdel Aziz. But it ignores the more mundane priorities that drive that; a desire to obtain monies from Iran for development and operational purposes. It does not derive, on the Mauritanian end, from a deep feud with Israel ideologically. It comes from the fact that Ould Abdel Aziz, as Machiavelli would say, came to power by devious means and in the process alienated many (though not all) old friends who are much stingier today than they were but a few months ago. He has courted countries like Iran and Libya and so on to compensate for those fiscal setbacks. In Tehran, he was accompanied by the predictable combination of his Foreign Affairs Minister, his Minister for Economic Affairs and Development, a Counselor and two advisors. It is nothing of a show of force in the manner of, say, the 800 Brazilians who descended on Copenhagen not long ago, but no less deliberate. It has raised Ould Abdel Aziz’s profile in the short-term, but the real point is twofold: (1) to capitalize on assurances for (economic) assistance made by the Iranians during and after the Gaza crisis (recall when Ould Abdel Aziz met with Ahmadinejad during the Doha Arab Summit); and (2) to keep up the image of his government as “normal,” as has been the point of all his foreign visits since the election.