Ein schiitischer Krake
Eine Studie des belgischen Egmont-Instituts widmet sich der Instrumentalisierung der Schia durch die iranische Aussenpolitik:
From the second half of the 1980s onwards, a major shift would emerge regard ing the foreign policy of Iran. In an attempt to transform Iran into a post-revolutionary and manageable society, Khomeini did not only oust elements opposing his policies, but also radical forces that were supporting Iran’s violent exports. In 1989, after the First Gulf War and the death of Imam Khomeini, the politics of Iran changed dramatically, both internally and externally. The new political and diplomatic strategy of Iran was siyasat-i dast-i gol (‘policy of a handful of flowers’), a more gentle and sophisticated approach, often described as ‘pragmatic’. An aspect of this became the larger independence of Iran’s allies to integrate into their respective national context, making them indispensable for their own country. In this way, Iran could still rely on the loyalty of those organizations, without using them as proxies. This element becomes very clear when we watch the evolution of Hezbollah in Lebanon and SCIRI/ISCI in Iraq, as both groupings succeed in becoming politically relevant actors. At the same time, Iranian militant Islamism was still to be exported throughout the region, but in a more subtle way.
Der Bericht kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die iranische Führung die religiöse Dimension als einen Kanal benutzt, ihre regionale Hegemonie voranzutreiben, warnt allerdings auch davor, den Einfluss des Iran im Nahen Osten zu überschätzen. So soll die Proselytenmacherei unter syrischen Sunniten bislang kaum zu Übertritten geführt haben.
Schärfer fällt die Analyse des israelischen Irankenners Menashe Amir aus, der dem Regime den Willen bescheinigt, nach der Errichtung einer globalen islamischen Herrschaft zu streben. Doch sieht er die Zukunft des Iran optimistisch:
In effect, two possibilities now confront Iran. In the first scenario, the regime will collapse from the inside, buckling under the pressure of the protest movement, much as the Shah’s regime collapsed 31 years ago. (…) The second possible scenario would see the Revolutionary Guards take over the leadership of Iran more and more. In fact, they have already begun to do so by shunting aside most of the prominent ayatollahs. (…) Either way, in the end this regime will collapse.
Fragt sich nur, wieviel Gewalt die iranische Bevölkerung bis dahin noch ausgesetzt sein wird.
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