Religion, Verfassung und Aufklärung in den USA [TF-Dossier]

Zuletzt überarbeitet: 11. Juli 2008.

Wie konstituiert Glaube Gesellschaften? Ein Beitrag von Michael Novak und Jana Novak stellt den Zusammenhang von George Washingtons Religiösität und der Geburt Amerikas heraus:

So how did George Washington persevere? As he acknowledged many times, he trusted “Providence.” George Washington had a silent ally to whom he regularly gave thanks, publicly and privately.

(…) For Washington, both the Bible and the writings of the ancients (especially military heroes) were storehouses of wisdom, and he studied each. When he ordered busts and portraits for the ornamentation of his parlors at Mount Vernon, he chose exemplars of the use of power from across the centuries: Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Charles XII of Sweden, Frederick II of Prussia. He also hung prominently on the wall of his large dining room, the most public room at Mount Vernon, two key portraits: the Virgin Mary and St. John. He kept clearly in mind—and exemplified in his own speech and behavior—the dual message of the Bible: that men are capable of both brutishness and nobility.

Das ist beste aufklärerische Tradition. Aufklärung ist zwar immer insofern gegen die Religion gerichtet, als sie ihre unbedingte Autorität in allen Fragen des Seins nicht anzuerkennen bereit ist. Sie ist aber ebensowenig die Kehrseite des Atheismus. Nicht ohne Grund war der Deismus die vorherrschende Geisteshaltung in Bezug auf die Gottesfrage gerade vieler kontinentaleuropäischer Aufklärer. Auch der Rückgriff auf die Antike ist typisch für den Humanismus dieser Zeit. Numa steht Pate.

(…) There is some dispute concerning how religious most of America was during the years of the War of Independence. The shortage of clergymen and even churches was always severe along the paths of the westward migration. On the other hand, recent studies suggest that religious practice was more intense than previously thought. The “First Great Awakening,” a broad renewal of religious conviction, was slowly spreading through the colonies, even in the Anglican South, threatening the laws of religious establishment, for example, in Virginia.

Thus, it can be no surprise that at the first meeting of the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, in September 1774, when news was received of the sudden outbreak of war in Boston, the very first motion on the floor was for a prayer to seek the guidance of Almighty God. Resistance immediately erupted—not because prayer was thought inappropriate, but because John Jay and others protested that they could not pray in the same terms as other people present (Anabaptists with Quakers, Congregationalists with Episcopalians, Unitarians with Presbyterians). Sam Adams settled the dispute by announcing loudly that he was no bigot and could pray along with any minister so long as he was a patriot.

(…) In Pennsylvania and New York, the primary meaning of liberty seemed to be freedom from central government—liberty meant, at the very least, minimal government. In part, this flowed from the Whig tradition of Britain, and its strong emphasis on commercial and market liberty. It was also fed by Adam Smith and other Scottish commonsense philosophers who, along with John Locke, saw in human nature a “system of natural liberty.”

Der amerikanische Weg der Aufklärung verläuft anders als in Kontinentaleuropa. »Virtue was a presupposition of the Constitution, but it did not appear in the document itself. Nor did religion.« schreibt Gertrude Himmelfarb über die amerikanische Verfassung. »Both were omitted for the same reason: because they were presumed to be rooted in the very nature of man and as such were reflected in the moeurs of the people and in the traditions and informal institutions of society.«

Benjamin Rush, einer der Unterzeichner der amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitserklärung, befand »The only foundation for a useful education in a republic is to be laid in religion. Without it there can be no virtue, and without virtue there can be no liberty, and liberty is the object and life of all republican governments.« Alexis de Tocqueville notierte in seinen Betrachtungen über die amerikanische Gesellschaft, dass in Frankreich der Geist der Religion und der Geist der Freiheit in direktem Gegensatz stünden, wohingegen in Amerika beide auf demselben Boden wüchsen. Die USA, das Land, in dem das Christentum am stärksten ist, ist daher zugleich »das aufgeklärteste und freieste«.

Deisten und Unitarier, britische Protestanten, Römisch-Katholiken, Evangelikale und Juden fochten für dieselbe republikanische Idee. Himmelfarb: »In seeking respite from the religious passions of the Old World, the Americans did not, like the French, turn against religion itself.« In der Vision einer »city upon a hill« trafen sich das christliche und das republikanische Amerika. Wichtig war, wie Tocqueville schrieb, nicht etwa, dass alle Bürger der einen wahren Religion angehörten, sondern überhaupt einer Religion. Das schliesst ein säkulares Staatsmodel keineswegs aus: »The separation of church and state, however interpreted, did not signify the separation of church and society. On the contrary, religion was all the more rooted in society because it was not prescribed or established by the government« schreibt Himmelfarb.

Ich bin selbst nicht fromm, gleichwohl kein Atheist. Der amerikanische Weg einer Aufklärung, die sich nicht antireligiös geriert, scheint mir auch heute noch wegweisend, beschreitet sie doch den Weg der Mitte zwischen dem Terror, in denen die atheistisch durchwirkten Ideale der Französischen Revolution versanken, und den religiösen Diktaturen unserer Zeit.

Die USA unterscheiden sich grundsätzlich von allen anderen Grosstaaten oder Grossreichen in ihren politisch-gesellschaftlichen Fundamenten. Diese Nation (…) entstand aus einem politisch-religiösen Gründungsakt, der Glauben und Vernunft, Puritanismus und Aufklärung verband. Mehr noch, die USA wurden bewusst gegen das Grundprinzip der Alten Welt, gegen die Legitimität durch Geschichte, gegen die historische Legitimität europäischer Herrschaft gegründet. Deshalb hängen die USA als eine Nation von Einwanderern aus aller Welt viel mehr als andere Staaten, die sich historisch begründen, von der Integrationskraft ihres moralisch-religiösen Gründungsanspruchs ab. Die amerikanische Republik ist ein Vernunftstaat, der auf zwei Säulen ruht, nämlich auf den demokratischen Werten der Aufklärung (Freiheit) und auf den Grundsätzen der protestantischen Religion (Christentum) (…)

schreibt Joschka Fischer (”Die Rückkehr der Geschichte”, Köln 2005, S. 129). In der Tat wird auf dem europäischen Kontinent meist vergessen, dass Aufklärung noch ein anderes Gesicht hat als das der Französischen Revolution. Kontinentaleuropäische Intellektuelle sind allzuhäufig versucht, letztere mit der Aufklärung in eins zu setzen. Der fundamentale Unterschied zwischen dem anglo-schottisch-amerikanischen Modell der Aufklärung gegenüber dem kontinaleuropäischen dürfte vor allem in der Rolle der Religion liegen, aber auch die Rolle des Staates ist durchaus eine andere:

It is, of course, intriguing to consider where such fundamental differences over the basics of democracy originated. In part, the answer is surely historical. Both American and European democratic ideals arose from the Enlightenment, but from different periods of that epoch. Continental European democracy was born in the French Revolution and developed throughout the following century of revolution and counter-revolution. In 1789, it was Rousseau’s ideas of the feeling heart and faith in the inherent goodness of human nature that predominated. The key to justice and good government was to be found in humane and virtuous individuals – in highly educated experts.

so Getrude Himmelfarb in ihrem Buch “The Roads to Modernity”. Während nämlich das kontinentale Westeuropa (das es noch einmal zum überwiegend orthodoxen Osten hin abzugrenzen gilt) eine tiefe Skepsis gegenüber der Religion entwickelt hat, ist dies in den USA ganz anders, ohne jedoch, dass sich dort eine religiöse Tyrannei entwickelt hätte. Im Gegenteil: In den USA sind Staat und Religion strikter getrennt als dies wohl in den meisten Ländern Europas der Fall sein dürfte.
Welches Modell ist nun das erfolgreichere? Zu dieser Thematik sind jüngst drei bemerkenswerte Online-Artikel veröffentlicht worden. So schreibt Linda Kimball im “Intellectual Conservatice”:

The myth assures Americans that there was but one Enlightenment school of thought, that it is synonymous with American ideals and progress, and that religion — particularly Christianity — must be kept strictly separate from the State. Not only is all of this untrue, but these notions are invidious alien transplants to our shores.

(…) Moral constraints, believed our Founders, lead to a moral citizenry, which in turn leads to a moral government. Together, these positive goods create an atmosphere in which justice, order, and maximum freedom can flourish with a minimum of government.

Die Hunderten von Millionen Toten der Totalitarismen des 20. Jahrhunderts sind in den Augen der Autorin nicht nur das Ergebnis einer Herrschaft durch Diktatoren wie Hitler, Stalin und Mao, sondern auch von Denkern wie – man lese und staune – Hegel, Darwin und Freud:

(…) These millions died, not because of our Founders’ Christian-Judeo worldview, but because of the ideas generated by egocentric Franco-Germanic thinkers such as Hegel, Comte, Rousseau, Spencer, Babeuf, Darwin, Freud, Marx, and Engels. Ideas then acted on by great wicked ones such as Trotsky, Lenin, Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot. The same ideas — of sexual anarchy, moral relativism, wrath, malevolence, violence, furious hatred, and nihilism — that have corrupted some on the Right and in the GOP and which are the dark-forces that drive the Left as it avidly anticipates seizing Absolute Control and Power over America and Americans.

Das Gegengift zum Unheil totalitärer Herrschaft sieht die Autorin in einer Kombination aus dem, was Amerika gross gemacht hat:

The antidote should be obvious. It is rededication to and revival of all that made America great in the first place, “the indisputable foundations of society are man’s Creator, sanctity of life, family, religion, individuality, enduring morality and virtue, property, custom, law, community, order, freedom, prosperity, and recognition of man’s fallen nature.”

Diese Zusammenstellung dürfte europäischen Intellektuellen fremd sein. Die Anhänger von Freiheit und Individualität sind hierzulande eben eher religionskeptisch. Thomas Brewton wiederum geht noch einen Schritt weiter, wenn er im “Conservative Voice” über “The Paradox of Reason” schreibt:

Reason as the only source of wisdom was almost immediately stripped of such pretense and revealed as naked savagery in the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror, instituted to compel conformity to the revolutionists’ political aims.

(…) Similarly, sixty years later with the advent of Darwin’s hypothesis of evolution, liberals began the destruction of the English and American foundations of constitutional democracy. As Darwin’s champion Thomas Huxley declared, the morality of Judeo-Christianity was ignorant superstition. There was no such thing as sin, no such thing as right or wrong; there was only the struggle for survival. (…)

Hier haben wir auch des Rätsels Lösung, warum amerikanische Konservative ein Problem mit Darwin haben. Von der Klage über die Abschaffung der Auffassung von der menschlichen Sünde schlägt Brewton einen Bogen zu den totalitären Diktaturen des 20. Jahrhunderts:

In such a world, there is nothing – absolutely nothing – in “reason” to gainsay the slaughter of tens of millions of people by Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, or Chairman Mao. If there is no morality, no higher law, no God, we are left with a simple guiding principle to order life: might makes right. Whatever, and I do mean whatever, the ruler can impose is to be the law.

Manchem mag das irgendwie altbacken oder gar reaktionär klingen, aber nun kommt wieder ein Moment ins Spiel, das aus europäischer Perspektive mit der starken Wertschätzung für Religion nicht zusammenzupassen scheint, nämlich die Betonung des Individualismus:

Thus we have the steady erosion of the inalienable individual rights, especially private property rights, enshrined in the Bill of Rights. The might of the mob, intent upon grasping ever more welfare-state benefits, must triumph over the rights and responsibilities of individuals. How, ask the liberals, can the rights of an obscure individual stand in the way of Progress and the “common good,” defined as the welfare state’s egalitarian redistribution of wealth and income?

(…) Reason as the sole guide turns out to be a contradiction. If there are no standards, no human nature to be understood beyond the Darwinian belief that there is no fixed being, no fixed human nature, that instead humans are becoming, or evolving, then there is no point in seeking a good or just political society. Whoever comes along with sufficient power to impose his will upon us cannot be denied, because he is a Darwinian, material, evolutionary factor shaping the presumably ever-changing nature of the human animal.

In such a world, Al Queda has as much claim to legitimacy as liberals or Judeo-Christian traditionalists. Hence, we are back to square one, the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror, executed today by Islamic suicide bombers.

Da in Westeuropa seit den Kreuzzügen und der Inquisition (nicht zu unrecht) die Religion grundsätzlich im Verdacht steht, ein totalitären Potential zu haben, das es zu beherrschen gilt, wird hierzulande selten eine Weltanschauung vertreten, die Religiosität mit Individualismus kombiniert. Ganz in diesem Sinne schreibt Don Feder, dass “Atheists Won’t Save Europe”:

From religion comes hope for the future and a sense of societal obligation (i.e., a non-hedonistic worldview). No faith, no hope. No hope for the future, no sense of obligation – hence, no children.

The United States has both the highest birthrate (2.11) and the highest church attendance in the industrialized world. Domestically, demographic differences parallel religious observance. Salt Lake City and Tupelo, Mississippi have higher fertility rates than Manhattan and San Francisco.

Und auch hier wieder geht Religiösität einher mit einer starken Wertschätzung für das Individuum:

What do atheists have to offer in place of God to give meaning to life – democracy, human rights, reason, la dolce vita?

The dignity of the individual was first proclaimed at Sinai. The Torah sets forth individual rights and responsibilities. Democracy got a huge impetus from the Protestant Reformation.

From the French Revolution to the blood-drenched isms of the 20th century, more people were killed in the name of reason – liberty, equality and fraternity, or “scientific” socialism, or “scientific” theories of race – than in all of the religious wars spanning the course of history combined.

Auch wenn mir persönlich diese Religiösität eher fremd ist, so muss man sie doch angemessen bewerten. Unübersehbar ist dieser Form amerikanischer Frömmigkeit ein starkes Moment des Individualismus und Antitotalitarismus zu eigen, was sie von kontinentaleuropäischer Religiösität offenbar unterscheidet. Die genannte Gertrude Himmelfarb erklärt diesen Untschied der USA gegenüber Europa so:

By contrast, although the United States Constitution was drafted in 1787, only two years before Louis XVI summoned the Estates General, that document looked back to an earlier time when the inherent virtue of human nature was not taken for granted – or even taken very seriously. The American Founders deliberately attempted to “people-proof” the new republic’s government, so that it would be – in Alexander Hamilton’s much quoted phrase – “a machine that would go of itself.” As a result, and to this day, Americans celebrate virtue, but remain skeptical of its value as a reliable check on governmental power.

Beide, Amerika und Europa, teilen allerdings den Säkularismus. Die einen aus religiöser Überzeugung, die anderen aus Skepsis gegenüber der Religion.

Was die USA von Europa unterscheidet:

Three-quarters of Americans say they are proud to be Americans; only one-third of the people in France, Italy, Germany, and Japan give that response about their own countries. Two-thirds of Americans believe that success in life depends on one’s own efforts; only one-third of Europeans say that. Half of Americans, compared to one-third of Europeans, say belief in God is essential to living a moral life.

Und was die USA den Europäern voraushaben:

Understanding freedom is a matter of no small importance. The Founders believed that it was one of at least three fundamental rights from God, along with life and the pursuit of happiness. These three rights are interrelated: not only does liberty, of course, depend on life, but the pursuit of happiness depends on liberty. In fact, evidence shows that freedom and happiness are strongly linked. (…)
The data and evidence don’t prove that all kinds of freedom bring equal happiness, or that more freedom is always better than less. For example, what about economic freedom? Pundits and politicians on the left often tell us that a free economy makes for an unhappy population: the disruptions of capitalism make us insecure, and we would prefer the security of generous welfare programs and national health care. But for most people, it turns out, that isn’t true. (…)
In a 2006 survey asking if respondents endorsed the right of people with antireligious views to speak publicly, those who said “no” were a third likelier than those who said “yes” to say that they were not too happy. In other words, religious tolerance—even tolerance of anti-religiousness—is strongly linked with happiness.

Unbedingte Leseempfehlung. Zurück zur Frage, worin sich die amerikanische Erfahrung mit Religion von der in Europa unterscheidet:

So let me begin with two propositions. The first one is that in the American experience, the separation of church and state, which by and large we acknowledge as a rough-and-ready principle, does not necessarily mean the separation of religion from public life. Another way of saying this is that America has a strong commitment to secularism, but it is secularism of a particular kind, understood in a particular way.Second, that the United States has achieved in practice what seemed impossible in theory: a reconciliation of religion with modernity, in contrast, as I say, to the Western European pattern. In the United States religious belief has proven amazingly persistent even as the culture has been more and more willing to embrace enthusiastically all or most of the scientific and technological agenda of modernity.

… so Wilfred McClay (University of Tennessee at Chattanooga) auf dem “Pew Forum’s biannual conference on religion, politics and public life”. Sehr lesenswert und zugleich problematisch: McClay leitet den Säkularismus aus dem Christentum ab:

The ability of the United States, then, to reconcile religion and modernity depended in part on its ability to hold groups and ideas in competition with one another, and this ability has roots that go even deeper than the country’s actual beginnings. Ultimately, they are grounded in certain characteristic features of Christianity itself (…)

You’ll recall, that Jesus of the Christian scriptures surprised his followers by declining to be a political leader and declaring that his kingdom was not of this world (…) Two kingdoms, two cities, two spheres — this feature of Christianity is one of the chief resources it has always brought to the problem of the organization of political life in a religious society, and it’s one of its chief resources now. [It is] something I’m not as knowledgeable about, but Islam seems to me to have a problem in this department.

Säkularismus i.S. einer Trennung von Staat und Religion existiert entweder als eigenständiger Wert oder gar nicht. Hervorragend finde ich den Text dennoch, weil er deutlich macht, dass Glaube und Moderne sich nicht widersprechen müssen. Wie die amerikanische Historikerin Gertrude Himmelfarb schreibt:

The American Founders deliberately attempted to “people-proof” the new republic’s government, so that it would be – in Alexander Hamilton’s much quoted phrase – “a machine that would go of itself.” As a result, and to this day, Americans celebrate virtue, but remain skeptical of its value as a reliable check on governmental power.

George Bushs Rede vor der Knesset zeigt es wieder einmal deutlich: Der Kampf gegen den Islamismus ist kein Kampf gegen den Islam. Allen Unkenrufen zum Trotze treibt Bush keineswegs “die” Muslime in die Arme von al-Qaida & Co. Das macht seine Rede so vorzüglich. Hier gibt es keinen Werterelativismus und der Islam als solcher ist nicht das Problem (Hervorhebung von mir – MK):

The fight against terror and extremism is the defining challenge of our time. It is more than a clash of arms. It is a clash of visions, a great ideological struggle. On the one side are those who defend the ideals of justice and dignity with the power of reason and truth. On the other side are those who pursue a narrow vision of cruelty and control by committing murder, inciting fear, and spreading lies.
This struggle is waged with the technology of the 21st century, but at its core it is an ancient battle between good and evil. The killers claim the mantle of Islam, but they are not religious men. No one who prays to the God of Abraham could strap a suicide vest to an innocent child, or blow up guiltless guests at a Passover Seder, or fly planes into office buildings filled with unsuspecting workers. In truth, the men who carry out these savage acts serve no higher goal than their own desire for power. They accept no God before themselves. And they reserve a special hatred for the most ardent defenders of liberty, including Americans and Israelis.
And that is why the founding charter of Hamas calls for the “elimination” of Israel. And that is why the followers of Hezbollah chant “Death to Israel, Death to America!” That is why Osama bin Laden teaches that “the killing of Jews and Americans is one of the biggest duties.” And that is why the President of Iran dreams of returning the Middle East to the Middle Ages and calls for Israel to be wiped off the map.
There are good and decent people who cannot fathom the darkness in these men and try to explain away their words. It’s natural, but it is deadly wrong. As witnesses to evil in the past, we carry a solemn responsibility to take these words seriously. Jews and Americans have seen the consequences of disregarding the words of leaders who espouse hatred. And that is a mistake the world must not repeat in the 21st century.

Diese Worte stehen in einer Reihe ähnlicher Äusserungen Bushs über den Islam. Kreuzzug gegen den Islam? Nicht die Spur. Man kann nun einmal über den Mann denken, wie man will. Seine Worte und Taten jedenfalls sind weit davon entfernt, ein christlich-abendländisches Äquivalent zu denen islamistischer Terroristen zu bilden. Dass der erste Moslem im amerikanischen Kongress seinen Eid auf den Koran ablegt anstatt auf die Bibel, geriet in den USA zu einem Politikum, das auch hierzulande diskutiert wurde.

Mir steht es nicht zu, irgendwelche Urteile darüber abzugeben, ob für den Kongress ein Eid auf den Koran opportun ist oder nicht. Bemerkenswert aber Ellisona Bezug auf Amerikas Gründerväter:

“Sie waren tolerant in Religionsfragen und glaubten, dass man Wissen und Weisheit aus vielen Quellen gewinnen kann – auch aus dem Koran.”

so Ellison, der damit ganz richtig liegen dürfte. Wie die amerikanische Historikerin Gertrude Himmelfarb schreibt: “Virtue was a presupposition of the Constitution, but it did not appear in the document itself. Nor did religion.” Wichtig war den Gründungsvätern demnach nicht, WELCHE Religion die Menschen haben, sondern DASS sie eine haben. Von diesem Standpunkt aus liesse sich gegen einen Eid auf den Koran nichts sagen. Die Auffassung, dass man “Wissen und Weisheit aus vielen Quellen gewinnen kann” spiegelt sich auch in der Tatsache, dass der Prophet Mohammed als einer von 18 Gesetzgebern auf dem Fries des US Supreme Court of Justice in Stein gemeisselt ist – zwischen Karl dem Grossen und Justinian!

Tatsächlich gilt die Vereidigung der “Constitution of the United States” und nicht dem Inhalt der Schrift, auf den der zu Vereidigende schwört. Der Schwur auf eine heilige Schrift hat vielmehr den Sinn, die Bedeutung des Eides zu unterstreichen. Es soll klargestellt werden, dass der Eid wirklich ernst genommen wird, sodass man ihn auf das ablegen lässt, was dem zu Vereidigenden heilig ist. Ellision selbst legt auf seiner Webseite übrigens eine erstaunlich israelfreundliche Haltung an den Tag, die auch zwischen den Zeilen keine islamistischen Sympathien erkennen lässt: Die Hamas hält er für das grösste Hindernis auf dem Weg zum Frieden und den Iran bezeichnet er als “leading sponsor of international terrorism”!

Vertreten die USA und Europa dieselben Werte?, fragt Lee A. Casey im Online-Journal “New Europe Review” und übt dabei Kritik am Demokratieverständnis der EU, das so ganz anders ist als in Übersee:

First and foremost, it enjoys the sole right to initiate legislation. The importance of this power cannot be overstated. The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (which represents the member states) play an essentially negative role in the EU lawmaking process. They may refuse to approve proposed measures, but it is the Commission that sets the agenda. By contrast, in the United States, the right to initiate legislation is vested, on the federal level, in the U.S. Congress, all of whose members are directly elected by the people. The President, who in practical terms also is popularly elected, is entitled to submit legislative proposals for Congress’ consideration, but cannot himself introduce a bill. Similar arrangements are followed in each of the fifty states, where elected legislatures enjoy the initiative in lawmaking, with more or less participation by elected state governors.

Moreover, the European Commission also serves as the EU’s collegial executive, with the power to “enforce” European law determining, at least in the first instance, whether member states have met their obligations under the applicable treaties. If a state does not then comply, the matter is referred to the European Court of Justice for decision. Again, in the United States, the elected President and state governors exercise the executive role, including the quasi-judicial function (at least by Civil Law standards) of determining in the first instance when laws have been violated, and then bringing cases to the courts for disposition.

This combination of legislative, executive and quasi-judicial authority, along with the very practical power of a well-entrenched bureaucracy in Brussels, begins to look uncomfortably like an older form of European governance – absolutism.

Ein unterschiedliches Rechtsverständnis zeigt sich gegenüber dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof:

In any case, whatever the root causes of this trans-Atlantic democracy division, there is little doubt that European elites have been far more willing then their American counterparts to vest very substantial power in expert institutions that have no direct accountability to the electorate. Europe is, of course, entitled to its view and to its own institutions. However, as the EU proceeds to promote its model on the international level, conflict with the United States is inevitable. Indeed, this difference of opinion is one important reason why the United States and Europe have clashed over institutional issues in recent years, especially over the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) and, more generally, over the proper role of international law.

From the American perspective – a view broadly shared by both the Bush and Clinton Administrations – the newly established ICC exercises too much unchecked power. Although the court’s supporters are quick to claim that its basic principles (as outlined in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court) have long been accepted by the international community at large, including the United States, the ICC is revolutionary. It represents the first genuine international institution of government enjoying both the power to authoritatively interpret critical aspects of international law (including the laws governing the use of military force), and to enforce its view through criminal prosecutions of individual citizens. (…)

Of course, vesting such important power in a super-national body caused far less concern in Europe than in the United States. As suggested above, Europe is far more willing to rely upon the good intentions of officials and experts, and one of the most common responses to American claims of unchecked ICC power has been that the court will control itself because it is staffed by highly trained professionals.

Diese Unterschiede sind nicht der Tagespolitik geschuldet, sondern Ausdruck verschiedener Weltbilder:

There is, of course, a temptation in Europe – and in certain American quarters – to consider the fundamental split over the ICC, as well as the 2003 Iraq War and a number of lesser issues, as the result of President George W. Bush’s policies and personality. In fact, the fundamentally different attitudes towards international law and institutions pre-dated Bush’s election in 2000. It was, for example, President Bill Clinton who first rejected the ICC treaty, specifically recommending to his successor that the instrument not be presented to the Senate for advice and consent because of the court’s fundamental flaws. Similarly, in 1999, when the Clinton Administration was determined to use NATO forces against Slobodan Milosevic’s Yugoslavia over Kosovo, well-founded European legal objections were simply dismissed by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. As reported by Mrs. Albright’s State Department spokesman, James Rubin, when British officials noted that their lawyers were objecting to the use of military force against Belgrade, she replied simply “get new lawyers.”

What really is at work here is not different styles, but different ways of seeing the world. Those who believe that a change in leadership in Washington will change things fundamentally in European-American relations are likely to be disappointed. Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic would do well to accept this as a fact, and to consider ways in which Europe and America can nevertheless work together towards those many objectives that they do clearly continue to share.

Die Entzweiung sieht der Autor historisch begründet – ob Casey das fabelhafte Werk von Gertrude Himmelfarb gelesen hat? :

It is, of course, intriguing to consider where such fundamental differences over the basics of democracy originated. In part, the answer is surely historical. Both American and European democratic ideals arose from the Enlightenment, but from different periods of that epoch. Continental European democracy was born in the French Revolution and developed throughout the following century of revolution and counter-revolution. In 1789, it was Rousseau’s ideas of the feeling heart and faith in the inherent goodness of human nature that predominated. The key to justice and good government was to be found in humane and virtuous individuals – in highly educated experts.

By contrast, although the United States Constitution was drafted in 1787, only two years before Louis XVI summoned the Estates General, that document looked back to an earlier time when the inherent virtue of human nature was not taken for granted – or even taken very seriously. The American Founders deliberately attempted to “people-proof” the new republic’s government, so that it would be – in Alexander Hamilton’s much quoted phrase – “a machine that would go of itself.” As a result, and to this day, Americans celebrate virtue, but remain skeptical of its value as a reliable check on governmental power.

Sicherlich ist Casey anzukreiden, dass er die EU mit Europa gleichsetzt, anstatt Gemeinsamkeiten der einzelnen demokratischen Traditionen Europas herauszuarbeiten. Vieles von dem, was er an der EU kritisiert, ist auch aus Europa zu vernehmen. Seine Ausführungen sind jedoch insofern wertvoll, als sie das amerikanische Verständnis von Demokratie erhellen und deutlich machen, dass ein Regierungswechsel in den USA daran nichts grundlegend ändern wird. Mancher mag das für gut halten, mancher eben nicht.

Two hundred thirty-one years ago, 56 brave men signed their names to a bold creed of freedom that set the course of our Nation and changed the history of the world. On this anniversary, we remember the great courage and conviction of our Founders, and we celebrate the enduring principles of our Declaration of Independence.

so der amerikanische Präsident George Bush in seiner diesjährigen Ansprache zum amerikanischen Nationalfeiertag am 4. Juli. Dazu meint Michael Berliner beim “Capitalism Magazine”:

Political independence is not a primary. It rests on a more fundamental type of independence: the independence of the human mind. It is the ability of a human being to think for himself and guide his own life that makes political independence possible and necessary. The government as envisaged by the Founding Fathers existed to protect the freedom to think and to act on one’s thinking. If human beings were unable to reason, to think for themselves, there would be no autonomy or independence for a government to protect. It is this independence that defines the American Revolution and the American spirit.

Einige Mythen, die sich um den 4. Juli ranken, werden bei HNN klargestellt. Was man sich heute kaum noch vorstellen kann: Vor 231 Jahren hatte die amerikanische Unabhängigkeitserklärung wohl nirgends ausserhalb der USA solchen Enthusiasmus ausgelöst wie in Frankreich. Männer wie La Fayette, Chastellux, Mirabeau und viele andere wussten: “Honorer l’Amérique, c’est honorer la France.”

-MIchael Kreutz